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Abstract:
Many healthcare providers in the US are seeking increased efficiency and effectiveness by rapidly
adopting information technology (IT) solutions such as electronic medical record (EMR) systems.
Legislation such as the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH),
which codified the adoption and “meaningful use” of electronic records in the US, has further spurred the
industry-wide adoption of EMR. However, despite what are often large investments in EMR, studies
indicate that the healthcare industry maintains a culture of system workarounds. Though perhaps not
uncommon, the creation of informal workflows among healthcare workers is problematic for assuring
information security and patient privacy, particularly when involving decisions of information management
(e.g., information storage, retrieval, and/or transmission). Drawing on the framework of contextual
integrity, we assert that one can often explain workarounds involving information transmissions in terms of
trade-offs informed by context-specific informational norms. We surveyed healthcare workers and
analyzed their willingness to engage in a series of EMR workaround scenarios. Our results indicate that
contextual integrity provides a useful framework for understanding information transmission and
workaround decisions in the health sector. Armed with these findings, managers and system designers
should be better able to anticipate healthcare workers’ information transmission principles (e.g., privacy
norms) and workaround patterns (e.g., usage norms). We present our findings and discuss their
significance for research and practice.
Keywords: Contextual Integrity, Workarounds, Health Information Technology, Privacy, Information

Security, Electronic Medical Records (EMR).
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Exploring the Role of Contextual Integrity in EMR System Workaround Decisions

Introduction
[T]echnology [must be] quickly, easily, and safely modified to keep abreast of local conditions; the
lack of this capacity results in increasing divergence between “work as imagined” and “work as
performed,” increasing the articulation work clinicians must perform to bridge this gap, and
ultimately leading to a plethora of informal workarounds, all locally reasonable but potentially
working at cross-purposes globally.
—Robert Wears (2015, p. 143)

Due to the essential nature of healthcare, much investment has been made in technology to radically
improve the success rate of even the most precarious medical procedures. When compared to other
industries, however, concerns over privacy, costs, and reliability have hindered the adoption of information
technology (IT) in the health sector over the past several decades (Angst & Agarwal, 2009; Chen & Xu,
2013; Goldschmidt, 2005; Payton, Pare, Le Rouge, & Reddy, 2011; Wu, Wang, & Lin, 2007). In recent
years, the promise of IT in healthcare (i.e., health IT 1) has taken center stage in the US with congressional
stimulus for the adoption and “meaningful use” of health IT (e.g., The Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH)) (Blumenthal, 2010). These stimuli appear to be having the
intended effect with health IT adoption rates in the US up dramatically since 2010 (Adler-Milstein et al.,
2014).
As in prior studies (e.g., Reardon & Davidson, 2007), in this study, we investigate one type of health IT:
electronic medical records (EMR). An EMR system provides a digital record of patients’ health-related
information that can be “created, gathered, managed, and consulted by authorized clinicians and staff
within one health care organization” (Bell, 2008, p. 16). Despite EMR’s potential to improve healthcare
delivery, merely adopting an EMR system is hardly a panacea for medical efficiency (Blumenthal &
Tavenner, 2010). Research indicates that, following their adopting new EMR systems, medical providers
often struggle to work in new and evolving systems while maintaining a consistent level of care in a
context where service delays and system failures can lead to bodily harm or even death (Goldschmidt,
2005; Spear & Schmidhofer, 2005). Therefore, a successful EMR implementation requires very careful
consideration of complex socio-technical issues inherent in the health sector—from conceptualization to
implementation (Harrison, Koppel, & Bar-Lev, 2007). For example, a recent working group sponsored by
the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) recommended that health IT implementations such
as EMR systems be designed to comply with legal regulations, provide interoperability, and be flexible
enough for both large hospitals and private-practice clinics—all while improving workflow, reducing costs,
improving the quality of care, and “maintaining long-standing beneficial patterns of communication”
(Kaplan & Harris-Salamone, 2009, p. 292).
System features or functionalities that are perceived to fall short of these established criteria in a given
context may lead healthcare providers to resort to “first order problem solving”2, in which they engage in
workarounds to sustain care (Ash, Berg, & Coiera, 2004; Debono et al., 2013; Ferneley & Sobreperez,
2006; Halbesleben & Rathert, 2008; Tucker, 2012). Workarounds are adaptations or improvisations of
prescribed processes or procedures to:
… overcome, bypass, or minimize the impact of obstacles, exceptions, anomalies, mishaps,
established practices, management expectations, or structural constraints that are perceived as
preventing that work system or its participants from achieving a desired level of efficiency,
effectiveness, or other organizational or personal goals (Alter, 2014, p. 1044).
Drawing on previous definitions of human-computer interaction (HCI) (e.g., Zhang et al., 2002), we
contend that workarounds in the healthcare context emerge as a result of the interaction of information,
technologies, and tasks.

The Health Resources and Services Administration defines health IT as the “application of information processing involving bo th
computer hardware and software that deals with the storage, retrieval, sharing, and use of health care information, data, and
knowledge for communication and decision making” (HRSA, n.d.).
2
First-order problem solving (FOPS) comprises problem solving at the point of the conflict such as working around an unresponsive
or cumbersome system. This as opposed to second-order problem solving (SOPS), which involves working within the system while
seeking change through the appropriate channels (Tucker, 2012).
1
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Although healthcare providers often employ workouts to improve their ability to provide patient care
(Debono et al., 2013), when involving the custody of patients’ personal health information (PHI) (i.e., any
information containing details regarding the health, medical history, or medical treatment of an individual
that is personally identifiable (Anderson, 1996)), these workaround decisions may constitute a
circumvention of the privacy safeguards built into systems and formalized routines (Murphy, Reddy, & Xu,
2014). Therefore, researchers need to uncover both the system and contextual attributes that influence
healthcare workers’ decisions to engage in workarounds. Drawing on the framework of contextual
integrity, we maintain that, when engaging in workarounds that involve the transmission of PHI, contextspecific informational norms play an important role in healthcare workers’ decision making process.
Contextual integrity is a standard that is “preserved when informational norms are respected and violated
when they are contravened” (Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 14).
To examine contextual integrity’s role in EMR workarounds, we surveyed healthcare workers and
ascertained their willingness to engage in a series of workarounds to EMR systems drawn from previous
literature and the popular press. Our findings support contextual integrity as a useful framework for
understanding healthcare workers workaround decisions. We present our results and suggest
opportunities to incorporate the principles of contextual integrity with system design efforts to reduce
workarounds.

2

Background

A key motivation for the recent interest in health IT implementations such as EMR stems from the reality
that, in the health sector, information often exists in silos that impede access and lack interoperability
(Goldschmidt, 2005). Yet, healthcare is a context in which favorable outcomes require parties to
successfully communicate private information with each other. It is this collaborative nature of healthcare
that results in disclosure predicaments throughout the course of care provision (Brann & Mattson, 2004;
Petronio & Sargent, 2011). To address these shortcomings, stakeholders have looked to EMR systems to
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of a notoriously inefficient industry. However, these systems also
present new challenges to protect information security and privacy of patients’ PHI (Payton et al., 2011).
A complicating issue is the reality that the widespread digitization of health information resulting from
increased EMR implementation has also been accompanied by a rise in the number of information
security breaches (e.g., unintended disclosure or unsanctioned exposure of PHI). For example, the
Ponemon Institute’s (2014) Fourth Annual Benchmark Study on Patient Privacy & Data Security found that
90 percent of healthcare organizations have had at least one data breach in the 2010-2013 period, and 38
percent reported that they had more than five incidents in 2013. This statistic is up from only 29 percent
that reported more than five incidents from 2008 to 2010. Further, the Identity Theft Resource Center
(ITRC) recently reported that the healthcare industry is one of the most affected industries, accounting for
43.8% of the all known breaches and exposing over 8.8 million records (ITRC, 2014).
These breach statistics highlight an important dichotomy: the digitization of health information has the
potential to increase both legitimate and illegitimate use of sensitive health information. The novel risks to
information security and privacy that EMR systems pose mandate the implementation of security protocols
to maintain the confidentiality of PHI, yet these new responsibilities create workflow disruptions (Unertl,
Novak, Johnson, & Lorenzi, 2010) and often result in resistance from healthcare professionals to
implement privacy measures (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010). The Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) lists workflow adoption as a ”top 5” issue for
implementing security and privacy measures (DHS, 2013). The implication is that, when faced with an
overly rigid/inefficient way of interacting with EMR, healthcare providers often choose to work around
inconveniences, or perceived inefficiencies, to attend to the pressing needs of the situational context (Ash
et al., 2004; Debono et al., 2013; Koppel, Wetterneck, Telles, & Karsh, 2008; Tucker, 2012). In this way,
context is a primary driver of workaround rationalization. For example, Debono et al. (2013, p. 11)
describes tensions among nurses’ rationalizations:
… [o]n the one hand, studies reported workaround behaviors as necessary to deliver care or in
the best interest of the patient. However, nurses also identified them as unsafe in particular
contexts and as workarounds are not legally sanctioned, some nurses perceived them as
professionally risky.
Based on these reflections, we can see that healthcare professionals’ perception of a workaround’s
appropriateness varies according to its nature.
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Workarounds

Regardless of the system type, healthcare professionals need to consider two important factors when
evaluating workarounds: motivation and consequence. For example, Ferneley and Sobreperez (2006)
identify three classifications of workarounds: (1) hindrance workarounds, (2) harmless workarounds, and
(3) essential workarounds. Table 1 summarizes these general classifiers of workarounds.
Table 1. General Classifiers Workarounds

i From

Classification

Description of workarounds i

Implication

Hindrance

Hindrance workarounds are aimed at
circumventing a “system procedure or
process perceived to be too time
consuming, onerous, or difficult” (p.
347).

Not necessarily malicious, but shortterm gain in users’ workflow is
accompanied by an overall diminution
of system performance—particularly
as it relates to ancillary goals such as
security and privacy.

Harmless

Harmless workarounds are those
user-generated routines that are not
supported by the current system but,
at the same time, do not inhibit its
intended function.

Reflect workflow preferences or
system capabilities not supported by
the system and may provide a
roadmap for future system
enhancements.

Essential

Essential workarounds are those userprescribed procedures that are
deemed essential to the overarching
goal of the users’ job role.

Reflect an essential capability that is
lacking in the current system and are
likely to be viewed in a workgroup as
an acceptable practice. Often become
incorporated into the behavioral norms
among employees ii.

Ferneley & Sobreperez (2006); ii Button, Mason, & Sharrock (2003), Kobayashi, Fussell, Xiao, & Seagull (2005 )

Relating specifically to our context of interest, Friedman et al. (2014) describe workarounds observed in
the healthcare environment on the following three dimensions: (1) whether the workaround was temporary
or routinized (i.e., long term, ongoing), (2) whether the workaround was avoidable or unavoidable, and (3)
whether the workaround was deliberately chosen or unplanned. Table 2 summarizes these descriptors of
workarounds.
Table 2. Descriptors of Workarounds (Friendman et al., 2014, p. e81-e82)
Temporary/routinized

Temporary workarounds are “short-term solutions to a time delimited
problem”, whereas a routinized workarounds “become part of the regular
workflow”

Avoidable/unavoidable

Avoidable workarounds are procedures that solve an issue that could
otherwise have been avoided permanently (e.g., through appropriate system
design and/or use), whereas unavoidable workarounds occur when some
uncontrollable external constraint impacts a system user’s work processes.

Deliberate/unplanned

Deliberate workarounds imply an “explicit, self-reflexive decision” in order to
address a particular system limitation, whereas unplanned workarounds arise
unforeseen along the course of care.

The classifiers in Table 1 and the descriptors in Table 2 complement each other in describing
workarounds in the health sector. Therefore, one can classify a single workaround as one of the following:
hindrance, harmless, or essential, and further describe them as temporary or routinized, avoidable or
unavoidable, and deliberate or unplanned. For example, one might classify a healthcare worker’s reverting
to paper documents when the electronic system is unavailable in an emergency situation as essential and
described as temporary, unavoidable, and unplanned. However, these classifications and descriptors are
dependent on the context surrounding the behavior and the attributes of the EMR system. That is, the
same workaround may be avoidable in one scenario and unavoidable in another scenario based on the
current EMR system and context. These classifications and descriptors are manifest in the context of the
workaround decisions and influence the perception that engagement in a given workaround will preserve
or violate contextual integrity.
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Contextual Integrity

Contextual determinants often define the appropriate flow of information, a principle termed contextual
integrity (Nissenbaum, 2009). Contextual integrity is a multi-dimensional framework that characterizes
norms (and norm violations) in terms of (1) contexts, (2) actors, (3) attributes, and (4) transmission
principles (Chen & Xu, 2013; Nissenbaum, 2009). In the IS literature, contexts are known to be an
important factor in determining an individual’s privacy preferences (e.g., Bélanger & Crossler, 2011;
Conger, Pratt, & Loch, 2013; Mason, 1986). Specifically, contexts are “structured social settings
characterized by canonical activities, roles, relationships, power structures, norms (or rules), and internal
values (goals, ends, purposes)” (Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 132). According to its definition, context is a multidimensional concept. Roles define the capacities in which individuals act in certain contexts, and
relationships characterize the interactions and dependencies arising therein. Related to roles and
relationships, norms define the “duties, obligations, prerogatives, and privileges associated with particular
roles, as well as acceptable and unacceptable behaviors” (Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 133). Lastly, values
reveal the teleology of the context and define the ultimate purpose of the context and individuals’ shared
principles. The context-relative informational norms are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Context-relative Informational Norms (Nissenbaum, 2009)
Contexts

Backdrop of informational norms (i.e., healthcare)

Actors

Senders of information, recipients of information, and information subjects

Attributes

Information types, nature of information, data fields

Transmission principles

2.3

Constraint on the flow (distribution, dissemination, transmission) of information
from party to party in a context. The transmission principle parameter in
informational norms expresses terms and conditions under which such
transfers ought (or ought not) to occur (p.145).

Contextual Integrity as a Decision Framework

Contextual integrity provides a robust framework for violations of privacy wherein a violation of contextual
integrity signals a prima facie violation of privacy (Nissenbaum, 2009). As such, the framework can also
be used as a decision framework to determine whether or not an action constitutes a violation of privacy in
a given context. By assessing the context relative norms, one can establish the appropriate data flow for
the context. Therefore, establishing the contextual characteristics of a transmission informs the
transmission principles.
To test for violations of contextual integrity, one must first establish the transmission’s contexts, actors,
and attributes. Based on these characteristics, the transmission principles are established. A red flag is
the extent to which a new practice or proposed action is seen as a violation of the informational norms
(i.e., violates contextual integrity) (Nissenbaum, 2009). Table 4 summarizes these foundations of
contextual integrity.
Table 4. Foundations of Contextual Integrity (Nissenbaum, 2009)
Contexts
Actors
Attributes
Transmission principles
Red flag

2.4

Establish prevailing context
Establish key actors
Ascertain what attributes are affected
Establish changes in principles of transmission
Determinants: confidentiality, deservedness, entitlement, compulsion, need
If the new practice generates changes in actors, attributes, or transmission
principles, the practice is flagged as violating entrenched informational norms
and constitutes a prima facie violation of contextual integrity (p.150).

Healthcare as Context

As we note previously, context refers to activities, roles, relationships, norms, and values (Nissenbaum,
2009). Therefore, to establish the healthcare context, we must distinguish these distinct yet related
contextual factors. In healthcare, as with many contexts, roles often determine the nature of activities,
relationships, norms, and even values (Nissenbaum, 2009). There are essentially three roles that are of
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importance in the healthcare context: (1) medical experts and medical support staff (i.e., doctors/nurses),
(2) operations support staff (other healthcare professionals such as technicians and administrators), and
(3) patients (Paul, Ezz, & Kuljis, 2012). For this study, we focus on those who provide healthcare (e.g., the
first two groups) and the distinctions between them because medical experts and their operations support
staff are the primary users of EMR systems. To ascertain the contextual differentiation between those that
directly dispense care (i.e., doctors/nurses) and operational support (i.e., other healthcare providers), we
seek guidance from the most admired work in Western medical ethics, the Hippocratic Oath (Miles, 2005).
Hippocrates’ original oath pledged to respect conﬁdentiality: ‘‘What I may see or hear in the course of the
treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must
spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about’’ ("Oath of
Hippocrates”, 1995, p. 2632). Based in millennia of practice, the right to health information privacy is
universally recognized and has been codified in many countries with laws such as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the US (Appari & Johnson, 2010). The primary impetus for
this law was the protection of PHI from potential threats to patient conﬁdentiality emanating from electronic
healthcare transactions (Moskop, Marco, Larkin, Geiderman, & Derse, 2005).
Though first administered some 2,500 years ago, modern versions of the Hippocratic Oath continue to be
taken by many physicians and it largely governs the ideal teleology of the healthcare industry (Antoniou et
al., 2010; Tyson, 2001). Today, one can summarize the oath in three principles: (1) beneficence, (2) nonmaleficence, and (3) confidentiality (Kirch, 2008). These three guiding principles largely inform the
activities, relationships, norms, and values of doctors/nurses, while operations support staff are more
guided by legalism (i.e., operating in the legal framework).
Implicit in the first two principles is the notion that doctors/nurses first and foremost are concerned with
preserving life (i.e., (1) whenever possible, heal; and (2) never harm). These principles form the basis for
the informational norms for doctors/nurses in the healthcare context. We contend that confidentiality,
rather than being merely a guiding principle, is a procedural directive mandated by HIPAA and HITECH.
That is, concerns over protecting private information are secondary only to the pursuit of the primary goal:
to care for patient’s health (Timmons, 2003). The primary teleology of healthcare further informs decisions
regarding the trade-off often required between privacy and performance (Tentori, Favela, & González,
2006; Xu, Luo, Carroll, & Rosson, 2011).
Contextual integrity stipulates that the actors themselves contribute to contextual norms. We contend that
actors’ personal characteristics, such as age and gender, are an important consideration, particularly in
the healthcare context. For example, a recent survey of U.S. physicians indicates an age gap in EMR
adoption. According to the report from the U.S. Center of Disease Control (CDC), 64 percent of physicians
under the age of 50 use EMR, while only approximately half of physicians above 50 have adopted
electronic records (Jamoom et al., 2012). Previous research has also established gender differences
among physician communication and patient centricity. For example, in a meta-analysis, female primary
care providers were found to spend more time with patients and have greater patient-centered
communication (Roter, Hall, & Aoki, 2002).

3

Study

Based on our discussion of the contextual nature of privacy perceptions and the prevalence of systems
workarounds in healthcare, we examine healthcare professionals’ decisions to engage in EMR system
workarounds. Specifically, we employ the contextual integrity framework to assess the role of
informational norms in healthcare workers’ decisions to work around EMR systems.

3.1

Establishing the Context of Study

To explore the role of contextual integrity in workaround decisions, we first established a context for the
decisions. As we note previously, central to the concept of contextual integrity are the transmission
principles that determine factors such as entitlement, deservedness, compulsion, and need for the
workaround decision. To establish the context of decisions, we developed scenarios based on responses
from healthcare professionals regarding their use of EMR published in previous research (Ilie, Courtney, &
Van Slyke, 2007; Ilie, Van Slyke, Parikh, & Courtney, 2009) and the popular press (e.g., Carollo, 2011;
Gray & Herbert, 2007; Hutchinson, 2011). By drawing the scenarios from prior healthcare research and
reports of actual incidences, we followed the tactics of prior researchers (e.g., Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001;
Piquero & Hickman, 1999; Siponen & Vance, 2010) to increase the realism and relevance of our
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scenarios for our respondents. Additionally, we introduced each scenario with a quote from a fellow
healthcare provider explaining the system’s short-comings that the workaround circumvents from the
user’s perspective.
The vignettes describe behaviors in the healthcare context as defined by the roles, relationships, norms,
and values. The roles represented in our vignettes are specific to healthcare providers, and the
relationship depicted is the relationship between healthcare provider and patient. The norms are defined
by the obligations arising between patient and healthcare provider. Finally, sustaining life and providing
care comprise the healthcare industry’s over-arching teleology. Table 5 summarizes the context of the
vignettes from the perspective of contextual integrity.
Table 5. Context-relative Informational Norms
Contexts
Actors

Attributes

3.2

Healthcare workarounds
Senders

Healthcare professionals

Recipients

Self/other healthcare professionals

Subjects

Patient
Health records (PHI)

Pilot Study

We originally considered six workarounds as potential scenarios in the early stages of this research.
Ultimately, we selected four scenarios for the full study after considering the qualitative responses
provided by a pilot study conducted with a group of healthcare professionals. We adapted three of the four
vignettes employed in this study from prior research, which included quotes from physician residents and
attending physicians employed at an outpatient clinic collected over a two year period in a large hospital
facility in the southern United States after it had implemented an EMR system (Ilie et al., 2007; Ilie, Van
Slyke, Courtney, & Parikh, 2008; Ilie et al., 2009). We developed the remaining vignette (scenario 4) from
published media accounts of healthcare responses following natural disasters, such as those experienced
following Hurricane Katrina and the 2011 tornado which severely damaged St. John's Regional Medical
Center in Joplin, Missouri (e.g., Carollo, 2011; Gray & Herbert, 2007; Hutchinson, 2011). We provided
participants of both the pilot and full study with a quote from a physician regarding the EMR system and a
brief description of steps that the healthcare providers took to work around the issue. Table 6 includes the
classification and descriptions of each scenario along with a summary of the perceived HCI issues leading
to the workaround. We report the full vignettes in Appendix 2. In Section 3.3, we summarize the vignette
and behavioral decision depicted in the scenarios.

3.3

Scenarios
Scenario 1: A healthcare provider uses a file transfer app on a personal device to transfer
unencrypted patient records from a hospital computer to a personal computer to
review patient treatment plans at home.

The first scenario involved a deliberately chosen hindrance workaround due to the willful disregard of
acceptable security practices for external access to the EMR system in response to the perceived
inconvenience of security token use. In prior research (e.g., Ilie et al., 2007; Ilie et al., 2008), investigators
found that physicians often felt that using a security token to authenticate their identity was unreliable and
unnecessarily burdensome because it delayed or prevented access to patient information. Drawing from
these experiences, scenario 1 described a workaround of a trusted system that used security token
authentication. It explained a hindrance workaround enabled by the use of a file transfer app on a
personal device to remove unencrypted files from the healthcare facility for offsite review. The vignette
concluded with the information that the physician would update patient files in the secure system prior to
beginning their next shift.
Scenario 2: A group of healthcare providers each remain logged into the EMR system at
separate terminals so that all providers have access to the system from each
terminal.
The second scenario described a routinized hindrance workaround in response to a perceived
shortcoming in an EMR system. The scenario described a system that required users to log in and out
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several times throughout the course of patient care, resulting in workflow disruption (e.g., Ilie et al., 2007;
Ilie et al., 2008). When a physician failed to log out of a terminal anywhere in the hospital, the physician
would be prevented from accessing the EMR system until they had retraced their steps—sometimes
across multiple floors—and successfully logged out of the previous terminal. According to the vignette, to
minimize this interruption, healthcare providers conspired to share credentials by leaving all terminals
logged in simultaneously. While this workaround clearly addressed the need for patient data access, it
exposed the organization to significant risk at the expense of patient privacy. Therefore, this scenario
exhibited a workaround that can arise due to poor EMR system design and implementation and the failure
to respond to user feedback.
Scenario 3: Instead of logging into the healthcare facility’s electronic medical records (EMR)
system to retrieve and enter patient information, a healthcare provider delegates
the responsibilities to a nurse to spend more time treating patients.
Scenario three described a routinized harmless workaround in which a physician relied on support staff,
such as nurses and assistants, to retrieve patient data in an effort to spend more time treating patients
rather than using the EMR system (e.g., Ilie et al., 2007; Ilie et al., 2008). Although the perceived
inefficiencies of the EMR system use led physicians to delegate their system use to other employees, we
can consider such behavior to be an acceptable practice in terms of patient privacy.
Scenario 4: A healthcare provider used a personal smartphone to quickly arrange the transfer of
patients in critical condition to another facility. The provider also used the same
personal smartphone to email screenshots of patient files to the receiving facility.
The final scenario exhibited a temporary essential workaround and involved a physician’s actions
following a natural disaster. The authors developed this particular scenario was developed following a
review of news articles published in the aftermath of various crises which affected healthcare facilities
(Carollo, 2011; Gray & Herbert, 2007; Hutchinson, 2011). In this vignette, we depicted a scenario in which
a tornado had rendered a medical facility’s auxiliary power source unusable, which prevented healthcare
providers from accessing the EMR system. According to the vignette, the facility had no formalized routine
for health information transmissions in the case of catastrophic power failure. In response, the healthcare
provider depicted in this scenario resorted to using their own personal device to communicate with and
transfer patient files to those facilities accepting patient transfers from the damaged facility.
Table 6. Study Vignette Classifications and Descriptions
Scenario

Perceived HCI issue

Workaround
summary

Classification

Descriptors

Scenario 1

Overly burdensome and
unreliable file transfer
process

Personal file transfer
app

Hindrance

Temporary, avoidable,
deliberate

Scenario 2

Login routine causes
workflow disruption

Remaining logged in

Hindrance

Routinized, avoidable,
deliberate

Scenario 3

Interaction with EMR
system takes time away
from patients

Delegation

Harmless

Routinized, avoidable,
deliberate

Scenario 4

Lack of a formalized
emergency back-up for
catastrophic power failure

Personal smartphone
after tornado

Essential

Temporary, avoidable,
unplanned

3.4

Hypotheses

Based on the contextual integrity framework, we generated our hypotheses about healthcare providers’
willingness to engage in EMR system workarounds. As we noted in Table 5, the context of the
transmission depends on the workaround scenario, the actors are healthcare professionals, and the
attributes are PHI. Therefore, to shed light on contextual integrity’s role in explaining workaround
decisions involving PHI, we examine differences among actors and across transmission contexts.
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Context: Workaround Scenario

A primary tenet of the contextual integrity framework is that red flag behaviors are considered violations of
privacy. We contend that, in healthcare, individual scenarios create context for which norms define the
acceptability of behavior. In other words, we can summarize the context of each scenario in terms of its
classification and descriptors. Therefore, we hypothesize the degree to which the behavior depicted in
each scenario is perceived by the healthcare providers to be a violation of contextual integrity (red flag)
will be negatively related to a healthcare worker’s willingness to engage in the workaround (main effect).
H1: The degree to which a behavior violates contextual integrity (raises a red flag) is negatively
related to a healthcare worker’s likelihood of engaging in the behavior (scenario 
engagement).

3.4.2

Actors: Role

In addition to the context the scenario provides, the contextual integrity of a transmission behavior is also
dependent on each actor’s role. In the healthcare context, the role of the healthcare worker determines
the informational norms. Due to the over-arching teleology of healthcare idealized in the Hippocratic Oath,
we contend that, in healthcare, doctors and nurses are more sensitive to violations of contextual integrity
arising from the transmission principles of an individual scenario. Therefore, we hypothesize an interaction
between scenario and job role (doctors/nurses and other healthcare professionals).
H2: Doctors/nurses and other healthcare professionals vary in their willingness to engage in the
workarounds across scenarios (scenario X role  engagement)

3.4.3

Actors: Individual Characteristics

Previous research has established the importance of individual characteristics in affecting decisions
related to IT use with moral or ethical dimensions (Leonard et al., 2004). As we mention previously,
researchers have found age and gender to be individual characteristics that influence behavior in this
domain (Leonard, Cronan, & Kreie, 2004; Roter et al., 2002). We hypothesize gender differences in work
around decisions by scenario. Further, based on gender differences found in the healthcare sector (e.g.,
female physicians), we hypothesize a three-way interaction between scenario, role, and gender.
H3: Healthcare professionals’ willingness to engage in the workarounds varies by gender across
scenarios (scenario X gender  engagement).
H4: Doctors/nurses’ and other healthcare professionals’ willingness to engage in the
workarounds varies by gender and role across scenarios (scenario X role X gender 
engagement).

3.5
3.5.1

Controls
Age

As we mention previously, age is also an individual characteristic that has IT-use implications. In the
healthcare sector, a recent survey of U.S. physicians revealed that physicians over 50 are less likely to
adopt EMR (Jamoom et al., 2012). We include age as a control in our study.
Central to the context of transmission decisions in healthcare is the organizational context. We controlled
for several important organizationally related factors.

3.5.2

Security Training Frequency

First, we included the frequency of security training as a measure of the healthcare worker’s security
education, training, and awareness (SETA). We also contend that including SETA frequency should
control for the organization’s security focus.

3.5.3

Sector

Another potentially significant contextual factor in healthcare is the sector in which the healthcare worker
provides care. We included the context of the health sector as a control in our study (i.e., public, private,
not-for-profit).
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Organizational Tenure

Contextual integrity is founded on the influence of informational norms in transmission decisions. To
control for the influence that organizational tenure may have in influencing the importance of such norms,
we included organizational tenure as a control in our study.

3.6

Sample

To test our hypotheses, we surveyed healthcare professionals working in the United States using an
online panel. Our final sample size was 177. Table 7 summarizes the cross-sectional panel of healthcare
professionals’ statistics. Panels are an accepted source of survey data, especially when the topic (such as
EMR system workarounds) requires full anonymity and not simply confidentiality. Providing anonymous,
off-site access to self-report surveys has been shown to be adequate and appropriate for eliciting selfreported incidences of security-related behaviors (e.g., protection-motivated behaviors (Posey, Roberts,
Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013)) and even socially undesirable behaviors such as organizational
deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2000, 2003).
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Sample
Average age

49.9

Average organizational tenure (years)

12.3

Sex
Job role

Sector
EMR

3.7

Female

54.2%

Male

45.8%

Doctor/nurse

41.8%

Other health professionals

58.2%

Public

32.8%

Private

35.0%

Not-for-profit

32.2%
75.1%

Instrumentation

We took a within-subjects approach (repeated measures) and provided vignettes to our sample of
healthcare professionals that described scenarios of system workarounds taken by a healthcare provider.
We chose vignettes for our study because they are especially apt at eliciting contextual norms (Finch,
1987). We developed our study following the precedent and recommendations of prior scenario-based
research (e.g. D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Siponen & Vance, 2010, 2014). Because we exposed our
respondents to multiple scenarios that were unrelated to one another, we controlled for the possibility of
an ordering bias by randomizing the order of the vignettes for each respondent, an effective
counterbalancing technique (Warner, 2008). As we note previously, we piloted a version of our instrument
with a group of healthcare professionals before executing the full survey.

3.7.1

Likelihood of Engagement

Immediately following each scenario, we asked our respondents to indicate the likelihood that they would
engage in the same behavior exhibited in each scenario. As in other studies, we used the single item
measurement to capture our respondents’ willingness to enact a behavior (Leonard et al., 2004; Siponen
& Vance, 2010). The use of single item measures immediately following a scenario is widely accepted in
the IS literature and meets the “most appropriate” threshold espoused by methodologists for single-item
measures (Siponen & Vance, 2010; Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004).

3.7.2

Red Flag

In the contextual integrity framework, transmissions that violate entrenched norms are said to raise a “red
flag”. To assess the degree to which the behaviors described in each scenario violate entrenched norms
(raise a “red flag”), we included two items measuring contractualism from prior research (Reidenbach &
Robin, 1990). Violations of contractualism are behaviors that violate a context’s implied obligations,
contracts, duties, and rules (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990). We contend that the degree to which a behavior
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violates the implied obligations, duties, or rules of a context should correspond to the degree to which the
behavior raises a “red flag”. The items ask respondents the degree to which the behavior violates (1) an
unwritten contract and (2) an unspoken promise (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990).

4

Analyses

To examine the role of contextual integrity in healthcare providers’ workaround decisions, we first
assessed the degree to which the behavior of each scenario raised a red flag among our respondents; we
then followed-up with a multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) to assess our hypotheses.

4.1

Red Flag Ratings

Contextual integrity provides a privacy decision making heuristic, and contexts stipulate obligations arising
from roles, relationships, norms, and values. To assess the red flag raised by each scenario, we asked
respondents to rate the behavior on two contractualism items. The two items exhibited strong reliability for
each scenario, and two scenarios rated relatively low on the contractualism scale, while two rated
relatively high. In the terms of contextual integrity, we refer to these as relatively small and large red flags
raised by the behavior. Table 8 includes the construct statistics of the contractualism items and the overall
red-flag ratings of each scenario.
Table 8. Scenario Red Flag Ratings
Scenario

Red flag

Mean

Std. deviation

Cronbach’s α

Scenario 1

Large

5.26

1.78

0.977

Scenario 2

Large

5.09

1.84

0.978

Scenario 3

Small

3.40

1.84

0.969

Scenario 4

Small

3.51

1.75

0.951

These red flag ratings further support the presence of context-relative informational norms in healthcare.
Scenarios 1 and 2 were large violations of contextual integrity (and, thus, had higher red-flag ratings)
because they exhibited a tradeoff of patient privacy for healthcare providers’ convenience (e.g.,
“hindrances”). Conversely, scenarios 3 and 4 both exhibited workarounds that enhanced providers’ ability
to serve the overriding goal of the healthcare context (and thus had relatively lower red-flag ratings when
compared to scenarios 1 and 2). For example, scenario 3 depicted a workaround that exhibits a tradeoff
between system use and time spent with patients (e.g., “harmless”), and scenario 4 depicted an essential
workaround caused by a catastrophic system failure (e.g., “essential”). Figure 1 exhibits the healthcare
providers’ red-flag assessment of each scenario.

Figure 1. Scenario Red Flag Ratings
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Results

We examined our hypotheses with a MANOVA on the four dependent variables (likelihood of
engagement) to test for unequal engagement in workarounds across the scenarios. We included the main
effect of the scenario (1), the interaction effects of job role and scenario (H2) and gender and scenario
(H3), and the three-way interaction between job role, gender, and scenario (H4). Our scenarios
constituted a four-level within-subject factor. Table 8 summarizes the corresponding subsample sizes for
our categorical variables.
Table 9. Breakdown of Sample

4.3

Males

Females

Totals

Doctors/nurses

n = 31

n = 43

n = 74

Other Healthcare professionals

n = 50

n = 53

n = 103

Totals

n = 81

n = 96

n = 177

MANOVA

We chose MANOVA because of its suitability for: (1) research designs with less than or equal to four
levels, and (2) our large number of participants (i.e., greater than number of treatments + 15) (Algina &
Keselman, 1997; Warner, 2008). Additionally, MANOVA is a robust procedure (Warner, 2008). We also
assessed of statistical power (Cohen, 1988). Table 10 summarizes the results of the MANOVA.
Table 10. MANOVA Results
Wilks’ lambda

F-value

P-value

Observed power i

H1: scenarios  engagement

0.941

3.320

0.021*

0.75

H2: scenarios * role  engagement

0.973

1.469

0.225

0.38

H3: scenarios * gender  engagement

0.964

1.973

0.120

0.50

H4: scenarios * gender * role  engagement

0.938

3.527

0.016*

0.78

Age * scenario engagement

0.994

0.328

0.805

0.11

SETA * scenario  engagement

0.954

2.575

0.056

0.63

Sector * scenario  engagement

0.941

1.657

0.131

0.63

Tenure * scenario  engagement

0.979

1.130

0.339

0.30

Hypothesis

Controls

Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices: Box’s M = 129.218 (p= 0.460);
absolute values of skewness & kurtosis for DVs < |1|; ialpha = 0.05
* p < 0.05; bold = supported.

The first hypothesis (H1) concerns the influence of the scenario’s context on the decision to work around
an EMR system. Our results indicate that the decision to work around an EMR system varies by
transmission scenario. We further hypothesized that decisions to work around EMR systems correspond
with the extent to which the workaround violates contextual integrity (raises a red flag). Table 11
summarizes the descriptive statistics of the likelihood of engagement item for each scenario. Appendix A
shows the means and standard deviations of our sample (separated by gender and role).
Table 11. Engagement—Descriptive Statistics
Scenario

Mean

S.D.

N

Scenario 1—engagement

2.57

1.85

177

Scenario 2—engagement

2.81

2.06

177

Scenario 3—engagement

4.44

1.99

177

Scenario 4—engagement

4.98

1.90

177

Figure 2 exhibits the willingness to engage in the workaround for each scenario given the red flag raised
by the behavior.
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Figure 2. Workaround Engagement by Scenario

As Table 10 shows, however, H2 and H3 were not supported. We found no significant interaction found
between scenario and role (scenario X role) or between scenario and gender (scenario X gender).
However, we did find support for H3: a three-way interaction between scenario, gender, and role (scenario
X gender X role). Figures 3 and 4 plot the three-way interaction.

3a. Males

3b. Females
7

Mean Engagement

Mean Engagement

7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
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2.00
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5
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1
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3
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Other HC Professionals

Doctors & Nurses

Figure 3. Three-way Interactions: Males & Females Plotted Separately
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4b. Doctors & Nurses

4a. Other HC Professionals
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Figure 4. Three-way Interactions: Healthcare Roles Plotted Separately

5

Discussion

In this study, we examine the role of context in healthcare professionals’ workaround decisions related to
EMR systems. Drawing on the concept of contextual integrity, we assessed the influence of contextual
determinants in healthcare professionals’ willingness to engage in system workarounds. We first
established the red flags raised by each of four vignettes that we provided to our respondents by
ascertaining the degree to which a behavior violates an implied obligation (i.e., contractualism). We then
employed a mixed-model research design to ascertain within-subject effects attributable to principles of
contextual integrity. We found support for the contextual nature of within-subject healthcare decisions with
scenario significantly impacting willingness to engage. Further, the base hypothesis from contextual
integrity was supported with significant differences between the vignettes depicting large red flag
behaviors and the vignettes depicting small red flag behaviors. Interestingly, we found that the two
workarounds classified as hindrances (per Table 6) were both associated with large red flags by our panel
of healthcare professionals.
Further, we found support for a three-way interaction between job role, gender, and scenario. Figures 3a
and 3b plot the engagement of doctors/nurses and other healthcare professionals separately for males
and females. First, for all males, doctors/nurses consistently exhibited a greater willingness to work
around systems across scenarios than others (per Figure 3a), while female doctors/nurses were less likely
to work around existing systems than others in all but one scenario (i.e., scenario 3 (see Figure 3b)).
Female doctors/nurses exhibited the least willingness to engage in the hindrance workarounds across all
groups (i.e., all males and non-doctor/nurse females), which perhaps reveals an increased sensitivity to
violations of contextual integrity. Further, in support of our hypotheses and in concert with previous
findings, females were the most likely to engage in harmless delegation when it provided increased time
spent with patients (i.e., scenario 3). In fact, this was the only scenario for which female doctors/nurses’
willingness was the highest of all groups.
Comparing Figures 3a and 3b also sheds light on important differences between genders across job roles.
As we can see, males had the greatest agreement across job roles on the willingness to work around in
scenarios 1 (file transfer app) and 3 (delegation), while females exhibited the greatest agreement across
job roles on the willingness to work around the EMR system in scenarios 2 (remaining logged in) and 4
(smartphone after tornado).
Figures 4a and 4b show the three-way interaction with doctors/nurses and other healthcare providers
plotted separately. The consistency of non-doctors/nurses’ willingness to engage in workarounds in each
scenario across genders is quite conspicuous (Figure 4a). However, Figure 4b exhibits the interaction
effect with clear gender differences among doctors/nurses. Across genders, doctors/nurses exhibited
pronounced differences between behaviors raising a similar red flag, which evidences their increased
sensitivity to scenario-specific privacy concerns over that of other healthcare providers. For example,
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among doctors/nurses, males were more willing to engage in system workarounds in all but scenario 3
(i.e., delegation). Interestingly, when the workaround was deemed essential (scenario 4), male
doctors/nurses were most likely to engage in a workaround above all other groups.

6

Implications and Contributions

Our findings offer insights for practitioners and researchers interested in HCI in the healthcare context,
where our application of contextual integrity to workarounds is an important example of the interaction
among information, technologies, and tasks. Further, we believe healthcare is a particularly promising
setting for contextual integrity because it is a hyper-connected, information-rich environment with
longstanding informational norms and communication patterns that inform information transmission
decisions. Healthcare is also one of the few industries where privacy has been codified by law (i.e.,
HIPAA) in the United States. In addition, healthcare decision making often has life-or-death consequences
that can override privacy with more critical duties. Supported by the framework of contextual integrity, we
examined healthcare professionals’ willingness to engage in EMR system workarounds. By using
vignettes, we were also able to drill down into the context of each scenario to ascertain significant
contextual determinants of each scenario. In this way, our within-subjects design serves as a novel
application of the contextual integrity framework.
As the Hippocratic roots of the health sector implies, our findings seem to confirm that healthcare
professionals’ workaround decisions are influenced by their prioritizing patient care over preserving
privacy. Though healthcare is a highly regulated industry, in the course of caring for patients, the legalistic
view is often usurped by informational norms that help explain privacy-related decisions. We found that
the behaviors in scenarios 1 and 2 (those that did not directly impact patient care) were more likely to
raise a red flag among healthcare professionals and less likely to be engaged in than the behaviors in
scenarios 3 and 4. This finding suggests that healthcare professionals across all roles are less inclined to
engage in workaround behaviors that do not directly impact patient treatment. It also signals that
healthcare professionals are more worried about their primary goal of treating and saving patients’ lives
than the secondary goal of privacy. These findings have implications for academics, policy makers, and IS
designers. Applying the contextual integrity framework augments the ability of stakeholders to anticipate
both privacy and usage norms for health-IT. For example, in light of these results, developers can test
new transmission principles prescribed in policies, procedures, interfaces, and systems—regardless of
their specific features—for violations of contextual integrity (i.e., red flags) to limit workarounds. We
contend that understanding transmission principles of the context is an important step in designing
systems and artifacts that are both secure and effective.
We also isolated the actors in the healthcare professionals. We found differences between those directly
treating the patients (doctors/nurses) and those who were part of the healthcare process but who did not
directly treat patients. Importantly, we found that doctors/nurses were more sensitive to the context of
individual transmissions than other healthcare professionals. This increased sensitivity was amplified
when we plotted males and females separately across job roles (i.e., Figures 4a and 4b). These results
occurred even though HIPAA and privacy laws have been in place for nearly two decades, which
illustrates the role of contextual integrity as determinants of IT usage and privacy norms in healthcare. The
significant interaction between job role, gender, and scenario highlights the complexity of privacyconsiderations in the healthcare domain.
Our findings also affirm the idea that privacy laws are not absolute and can be overridden by more critical
considerations and duties (Moskop et al., 2005). Researchers should find this result informative because it
helps to isolate the impact of context on privacy in an environment that is extremely regulated. It also
opens up questions about context in unregulated environments where the norms range widely. For
practice, these results present the reality of conflicting goals and transmission dilemmas in healthcare.
Finally, this research adds to the substantial work investigating IT adoption in the medical field. While
many studies have examined the adoption of health IT and EMR, relatively few have examined use and
workarounds in the way that we have. For example, rather than studying firm-level adoption of EMR, we
investigate health-related workarounds that occur at the individual level. Additionally, our work highlights
the importance of designing systems that minimize the trade-off between privacy and performance in
healthcare.
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Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research

While we believe our findings are instructive for research and practice, we note some inherent limitations
in our approach. First, we relied on self-reported measures to capture healthcare workers’ willingness to
engage in workarounds. However, to counter this weakness, we provided anonymous, off-site surveys,
which is an accepted practice for security and privacy research. As in prior research, we also used
vignettes based on actual workarounds to enhance the scenarios’ relatability to the respondents.
Second, we examined an important, but limited, set of contextual determinants (i.e., scenario, gender, and
role). Future research could build on these findings through experimental manipulation of the system
design features to establish the design standards and system capabilities that minimize the tradeoff
between working in and working around the prescribed IT environment (e.g., the establish factors that
increase the perceived red flag of a workaround behavior). Table 12 relates the determinants of contextspecific informational norms to the design lifecycle. Additionally, though we included controls for SETA
frequency, we did not capture the content of the SETA programs. Future research should investigate an
organization’s ability to influence informational norms through specific SETA initiatives.
Table 12. Contextual Integrity and Information System Design
Development phase

Planning

Determinants of informational norms





Contexts: Establish the range of relevant contexts for the planned system
Actors: Establish the key actors’ perspectives needed to design the system
Attributes: Establish the attributes of information required
Transmission principles: Establish the principles that ensure the contextual integrity of
information transmissions in the system.

Analysis

 Contexts: Determine the contexts for which the system is currently designed and isolate
coverage gaps
 Actors: Determine the actors’ perspectives currently considered in the design and
identify missing perspectives
 Attributes: Determine the set of attributes for which the system is designed and identify
missing attributes
 Transmission principles: Determine the principles implicit in the current system and
compare with those consistent with contextual integrity

Design

 Contexts: Design system for appropriate contexts
 Actors: Design system taking into account the appropriate perspectives and access
needs
 Attributes: Design system to account for specified attributes
 Transmission principles: Design system to maintain contextual integrity, including the
associated IT and interface design

Implementation

Maintenance






Contexts: Implement system within specified contexts
Actors: Provide access to appropriate actors with their respective access-levels
Attributes: Populate with appropriate attributes
Transmission principles: Train users on the informational norms upheld by the system
to decrease workarounds

 Contexts: Monitor for changes in contexts or the need to account for new contexts
 Actors: Monitor the perspectives of actors to be considered
 Attributes: Assess appropriateness of attributes and monitor for new attributes of
importance
 Transmission principles: Monitor the informational norms emerging from systems’ use
and configure training and/or system updates taking informational norms into account.
Identify workarounds and redesign system if necessary.

Finally, our findings also highlight an emerging issue of employees using personally owned devices for
organizational purposes. Two of our scenarios included a healthcare professional using their own device
to work around the EMR system. This trend has been dubbed “bring your own device” (BYOD) and is
having a profound impact on enterprise as 89 percent of U.S. firms now enable some form of BYOD
(Bradley, Loucks, Macaulay, Medcalf, & Buckalew, 2012). Whether personally owned or issued by the
organization, mobile devices such as the ones depicted in our vignettes are becoming commonplace in
healthcare environments with well over 50 percent of doctors using laptops, smartphones, and/or tablets
for medical purposes (McGee, 2012). Privacy risks are exacerbated with mobile devices due to their
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portability, and 78 percent of technology professionals have cited lost or stolen devices as a major
concern with mobile computing (Finneran, 2013). Even prominent hospitals, such as the Beth Israel
Deaconess Medical Center (a Harvard University teaching hospital) in Boston, have grappled with privacy
issues related to a stolen personal laptop containing unencrypted patient information (Cerrato, 2012).
Future research should further examine the role of BYOD and mobile technology in workaround and
compliance decisions.

7

Conclusion

In closing, we believe that healthcare is a unique context in which to examine privacy-related behaviors.
As legislation continues to prod the healthcare industry toward wholesale conversion to EMR, the ability to
understand workaround decisions is paramount to the success of these legislative initiatives. We amplify
our contributions by incorporating the workaround culture that exists within healthcare. We largely agree
with Nissenbaum (2009) that the duty of healthcare professionals to regulate the flow of information in
context of care is fiduciary. As such, contextual integrity is well suited to the healthcare context, which
implies an obligation to act in the patient’s best interest rather than to maintain confidentiality or protocol.
Until systems and artifacts are developed in anticipation of usage and privacy norms in healthcare (e.g.,
as informed through the framework of contextual integrity), we contend that workarounds at the individual
level will likely continue to plague this vital industry regardless of legislative initiative and institutional IT
investments.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Full Descriptive Statistics across All Scenarios
Scenario 1

Males

Females

Totals

Doctor/nurse
mean (s.d.)

n = 31
3.26 (2.14)

n = 43
1.77 (1.32)

n = 74
2.39 (1.86)

Other
mean (s.d.)

n = 50
2.82 (1.97)

n = 53
2.58 (1.71)

n = 103
2.70 (1.84)

Totals
mean (s.d.)

n = 81
2.99 (2.03)

n = 96
2.22 (1.60)

N = 177
2.57 (1.85)

Scenario 2

Males

Females

Totals

Doctor/nurse
mean (s.d.)

n = 31
3.65 (2.27)

n = 43
2.35 (1.66)

n = 74
2.89 (2.03)

Other
mean (s.d.)

n = 50
2.86 (2.06)

n = 53
2.64 (2.13)

n = 103
2.75 (2.10)

Totals
mean (s.d.)

n = 81
3.16 (2.16)

n = 96
2.51 (1.93)

N = 177
2.81 (2.06)

Scenario 3

Males

Females

Totals

Doctor/nurse
mean (s.d.)

n = 31
4.65 (1.98)

n = 43
4.95 (1.89)

n = 74
4.82 (1.92)

Other
mean (s.d.)

n = 50
4.26 (2.05)

n = 53
4.08 (1.98)

n = 103
4.17 (2.01)

Totals
mean (s.d.)

n = 81
4.41 (2.02)

n = 96
4.47 (1.98)

N = 177
4.44 (1.99)

Scenario 4

Males

Females

Totals

Doctor/nurse
mean (s.d.)

n = 31
5.84 (1.34)

n = 43
4.65 (2.15)

n = 74
5.15 (1.94)

Other
mean (s.d.)

n = 50
4.84 (1.96)

n = 53
4.87 (1.82)

n = 103
4.85 (1.88)

Totals
mean (s.d.)

n = 81
5.22 (1.81)

n = 96
4.77 (1.97)

N = 177
4.98 (1.90)
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Appendix B: Full Vignettes and Instrumentation
Scenario 1
“My problem with the electronic medical record (EMR) system is that if you’re out of the hospital, you have
to use this security token that I can’t stand because I don’t always have the token with me. Plus,
sometimes it takes a couple of times to get it to work. You want something that’s fast and this is like dialup versus cable.”
After completing each shift, instead of accessing the EMR system remotely using a security token (a
device used to prove one's identity electronically), the healthcare provider used a file transfer app on a
personal device to transfer unencrypted patient records from a hospital computer to a personal computer
in order to review patient treatment plans at home. Prior to starting the next shift, the healthcare provider
updates patient records with any necessary changes.

Scenario 2
“The problem with the electronic medical record (EMR) system is that if you log into the system to check
on a patient on the 2nd floor and you forget to log off, when you get up to the 10th floor to check on
another patient, you're locked out of the system. Sometimes I am locked out and don’t remember where I
was last logged in and then I'm stuck! I can’t log on again; it’s a big problem! I have to call everywhere I've
been and have someone see if I forgot to log out. Sometimes they will just log me off, but it’s a big
problem! You have to trace yourself backwards. It’s pathetic!”
After two years of regular requests made to the EMR system administrator asking for the implementation of
an automated logout feature, a group of healthcare providers eventually decided to each remain logged into
the EMR system at separate terminals so that all providers have access to the system from each terminal.

Scenario 3
“I have my nurse with me and she can look the results up in the electronic medical record (EMR) system
for me and have them ready when I get to the patient’s room because I’m busy. I will go see a patient,
then go do a procedure and then come back to see another patient, and another patient, then go upstairs
and do something else.”
Instead of logging into the healthcare facility’s electronic medical records (EMR) system to retrieve and
enter patient information, a healthcare provider delegated the responsibilities to a nurse in order to spend
more time treating patients.

Scenario 4
“The tornado destroyed our auxiliary power and prevented us from being able to access our electronic
medical record (EMR) system. All we had available to us was the latest hard copy of each patient’s file.
Since the building was not safe, we knew we had to evacuate as soon as possible. We eventually sent all
of our critical patients by ambulance to a facility over an hour away.”
After a medical facility loses electricity following a tornado and backup generators fail to keep essential
equipment functioning, a healthcare provider used a personal smartphone to quickly arrange the transfer of
patients in critical condition to another facility. The provider also used the same personal smartphone to
email screenshots of patient files to the receiving facility so that they could prepare for the arrival of patients.

Survey Items:
Engagement item: “Please rate the likelihood that you would engage in the same behavior exhibited in
the scenario”.
(1) I would not engage in this activity—(7) I would engage in this activity
Contractualism items: “Please rate the behavior on the following scale…”
(1) Does not violate an unspoken promise—(7) Does violate an unspoken promise
(1) Does not violate an unwritten contract—(7) Does violate an unspoken contract
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